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Incentivizing Cooperation in Sensor and Control Networks
J. Khoury, C. T. Abdallah, and J. Crichigno

wants its direct neighbors to participate, and wishes that they
further incentivize their direct neighbors to participate, and
so on. We now present several instances of the problem:
• Distributed sensing and control: In a wireless sensor/control network setting, a number of spatially distributed sensors are assigned the task of monitoring
and measuring a signal of interest. The nodes are
usually limited in their resources and must cooperate
in order to communicate an accurate measurement to
the supervising node. The supervising node is thus a
consumer of information and must incentivize as many
nodes as possible to assist in obtaining an accurate
measurement. In this setting, sensor nodes may be
rewarded for example by allocating more bandwidth to
them.
• Advertisement and/or search in social networks: Consider a consumer that wishes to broadly advertise a piece
of information within a social network and has access
to a small set of source agents. The consumer might be
a company wanting to buy Ad space on users’ pages for
example and is willing to invest in doing so 1 . A similar
problem is social information retrieval (or search) [2],
[3] in which a user wishes to get a query answered
and the user receives a utility from the answer(s). In
both of these settings, the agents participating in the
advertisement or the search incur a participation cost
and trade is constrained by an agent’s position in the
network.
• Propagating reachability information: A similar setting
to the previous one is advertisement of reachability
information as is the case with the majority of routing protocols in communication networks. The Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4], for example, is a pathvector protocol and is the de-facto protocol for Internet
interdomain routing. BGP is intrinsically about distributing route information about destinations, which are
Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes, to establish paths in the
network. A destination wishes that its route information
be globally advertised and the participating agents incur
a cost for doing so. The agents, Autonomous Systems
(AS), are economic entities that act selfishly when
implementing their internal policies and particularly the

Abstract— In this paper, we use game theory to model a
general participation game for a distributed and dynamic
network. Such networks may include sensing and control
agents. The main problem we are interested in is how to
achieve broad participation while aligning the incentives of all
the participating agents. A consumer node is willing to invest
an amount of rewards to get a set of networked sensor nodes,
alternatively agents, to participate in some desirable activity;
for example rewarding nodes by allocating more bandwidth to
them. For the scope of this paper, the agents are heterogeneous
sensors, and the consumer is a supervising sensor whether
that be a human or a super-node. The consumer desires an
accurate reading of a signal of interest; however, it may only
communicate with its direct neighbors, or the sensors closest to
it. Therefore, it must incentivize its neighbors to participate in
further advertising and participating in the (sensing) activity.
The neighbors then incentivize their neighbors to participate,
and so on. We assume the commodity being traded to be
the agent’s participation in the activity; sensing a signal, and
forwarding a query are some examples of participation. In
the resulting game, agents choose their offers strategically. We
prove the existence of equilibria for specific utility functions
and simple network structures.

I. I NTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the problem of incentivizing cooperation amongst a network of sensors. In a (wireless) sensor
network, a set of heterogeneous sensors pool their resources
in order to measure a quantity of interest. In general, a
source node (a consumer) needs to receive information about
a quantity that may not be directly accessible to it. The
source node may then request the information from other
nodes that will then propagate the request down to those
that are best equipped to measure the quantity of interest.
In order to measure and propagate signals however, sensor
nodes need to expand some resource (power), and so they
might not have an incentive to participate.
More generally, the problem we are interested in is that of
incentivizing a set of nodes (alternatively agents or players)
to participate in some activity that is of interest to a consumer. For example, the consumer might want to measure
a signal, to solve a problem, or to distribute a good. The
consumer receives a positive utility from every agent that
participates, whereas an agent incurs a cost to participate.
The consumer and the agents are located on a network
and communication, in the form of trade, may only occur
between directly connected agents. In essence, the consumer

1 Notice that in today’s social networks, information spreads quickly
starting from a set of sources. The agents in this case have a local incentive
to propagate the information to their circle. Other models exist as well for
information propagation based on utility [1] and they assume that agents
will exchange information only when they benefit from the exchange (in this
case gain information). In contrast, the problem setting we are interested in
assumes that distribution is subsidized by the consumer.
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an offer rij ∈ R(j), and deciding on a reward rjl < rij to
send to each candidate neighbor l ∈ B(j) that it has not
received a competing offer from. Note then that rlj < rjl
where rlj = 0 means that j did not receive an offer from
neighbor l. Player j then pockets the difference rij −rjl . The
process repeats up to some depth that is directly dependent
on the initial investment rd as well as on the strategies of the
players. In the sensor network setting, this translates into an
agent obtaining a bandwidth allocation from some upstream
agent and further allocating part of it in incentives to the
downstream nodes. We intentionally keep the reward model
abstract at this point, but will revisit it later in the discussion
when we define more specific utility functions. Let cj denote
player j’s local cost of participation. Finally, denote by Pj
the upstream reward path from j to d, Pj ∈ P(j) the latter
being the set of all simple paths from j to d. The reward path
Pj is defined recursively as Pj = (j, i)Pi when j selects i’s
offer rij , where the notation (j, i)Pi is the path formed by
concatenating link (j, i) with path Pi (rewards flow on path
Pj from d towards j). Define node i to be an upstream node
relative to node j when i ∈ Pj . The opposite holds for a
downstream node.
Assumptions: To keep our model tractable, we take the
following simplifying assumptions:
1) the graph is at steady state for the duration of the game
i.e. we do not consider topology dynamics;
2) the players are indistinguishable to the consumer d
i.e. d receives the same marginal utility from every
participation;
3) the advertised rewards are integers and are strictly
decreasing with depth i.e. ∀ j, l, rjl ∈ Z+ , and rjl <
rij when player j accepts offer rij . We let 1 unit be the
cost of advertisement 2 (a similar assumption was taken
in [2] to avoid the degenerate case of never running out
of rewards, referred to as “Zeno’s Paradox”);
4) a node that does not participate has a utility of zero;
5) the local participation cost is constant with ci = c = 1.
Strategy Space: After receiving a set of offers R(i) from
neighboring nodes, a pure strategy si = (rji , ri ), si ∈ Si of
an autonomous player i comprises two decisions as follows:
• Choose a single “best” offer rji ∈ R(i) (where “best”
is defined shortly in Theorem 1);
• Choose a reward vector ri = [rij ]j offering a reward
rij to each candidate neighbor j.
A strategy profile s = (s1 , . . . , sn ) and a reward rd define
an outcome of the game 3 . Every outcome determines a set
of paths to d given by Td = (P1 , . . . , Pn ). A utility function
ui (s) for player i associates every outcome with a real value
in R. We use the notation s−i to refer to the strategy profile
of all players excluding i, where s = (si , s−i ). The Nash
equilibrium is defined as follows:

decisions that relate to route selection and propagation [5].
• Group problem solving: In an effort to explore the
power of social networking in team problem solving,
DARPA has recently announced a network challenge [6]
to solve a geographically distributed problem that requires social collaboration. The problem was to find the
locations of 10 balloons dispersed across the continental
United States. A timely solution to the problem requires
broad participation and while DARPA, the consumer,
may and is willing to subsidize the solution, it has
access to a limited set of agents. DARPA’s utility
increases with participation while the agents incur a cost
to participate.
In this work, we use game theory to model a general participation game. The main problem we are interested in is how
to achieve broad participation while aligning the incentives
of all the participating agents. The consumer, denoted by
d, is willing to invest some initial amount of resource rd
to get the agents to participate in some desirable activity.
However, d may only communicate with its direct neighbors.
Therefore, d must incentivize its neighbors to participate in
further advertising the activity, who then incentivize their
neighbors to participate, and so on. We assume in this
paper the commodity that may be traded to be the agent’s
participation in the activity (whichever form participation
may take). In the resulting game, agents choose their prices
(offers) strategically and they are rewarded proportionally
to the size of their participation subtree (defined shortly).
We assume full information since our main goal is to study
the existence of equilibria rather than how to reach the
equilibrium.
We have initially studied the BGP game in [7], [8]. This
work extends the initial results of [7] by considering a
fundamentally different assumption on tie breaking under
competition. First, we define the general game model in
section II. Section III then presents the equilibria results for
two simple graph structures: 1) the line (and the tree) graphs
which involve no competition, and 2) the ring graph which
involves competition.
II. T HE M ODEL
We consider a graph G = (V, E) where V is a set of n
nodes (alternatively termed players, or agents) each identified
by a unique index i = {1, . . . , n}, and the consumer d, and
E is the set of edges or links. Denote by B(j) the set of
direct neighbors of node j. The game proceeds as follows: d
first advertises the activity to its neighbors promising them
a reward rd ∈ Z+ which directly depends on d’s utility
from participation. A player j in turn receives offers from
its neighbors where each neighbor i’s offer takes the form
of a reward rij . A reward rij that a player i offers to some
direct neighbor j ∈ B(i) is a contract stating that i will
pay j an amount that is a function of rij for each sale that
player j makes. Let R(j) be the set of all offers that are
known to player j through advertisements, |R(j)| ≤ |B(j)|.
After receiving the offers, player j strategizes by selecting

2 In

our setting, this cost might be the bandwidth lost due to attenuation.
abuse notation hereafter and we refer to the outcome with simply
the strategy profile s where it should be clear from context that an outcome
is defined by the tuple < s, rd >. Notice that a strategy profile may be
associated with an outcome if we model rd as an action. We refrain from
doing so to make it explicit that rd is not strategic.
3 We
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Definition 1: A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy
profile s∗ = (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n ) such that no player can move
profitably by changing her strategy, i.e. for each player i,
ui (s∗i , s∗−i ) ≥ ui (si , s∗−i ), ∀si ∈ Si .
Utility: We experiment with a simple class of utility
functions which rewards a player linearly based on volume
of sales. This model incentivizes participation and potentially
requires a large initial investment from d. More clearly,
let Ni (s) = {j ∈ V \{i}|i ∈ Pj } be the set of nodes
nodes downstream of i, and define δi = |Ni (s)|. When
si = (rki , ri ), the utility of player i from an outcome or
strategy profile s = (si , s−i ) is:
X
ui (s) = (rki − ci ) +
(rki − rij )(δj + 1) (1)

multi-stage game with observed actions [9] where stages in
our game have no temporal semantics. Rather, stages identify
the network positions which have strategic significance due
to the strictly decreasing rewards assumption. Formally, and
using notation from [9], each player i plays only once at
stage k > 0 where k is the distance from i to d in number
of hops. At every other stage, the player plays the “do
nothing” action. The game starts at stage 1 after d declares
rd . Players at the same stage play simultaneously, and we
denote by ak = (ak1 , , . . . , akn ) the set of player actions
at stage k, the stage-k action profile. Further, denote by
hk+1 = (rd , a1 , . . . , ak ), the history at the end of stage k
which is simply the initial reward rd concatenated with the
sequence of actions at all previous stages. We let h1 = (rd ).
Finally, hk+1 ⊂ H k+1 the latter being the set of all possible
stage-k histories. When the game has a finite number of
stages, say K +1, then a terminal history hK+1 is equivalent
to an outcome of the game (which is a tree Td ) and the set
of all outcomes is H K+1 .The pure-strategy of player i who
plays at stage k > 0 is a function of the history and is
given by si : H k → Rmi where mi is the number of direct
neighbors of player i that are at stage k + 1 (implicitly, a
player at stage k observes the full history hk before playing).
We resort to the multi-stage model (the fixed schedule) on
our simple graphs to eliminate the synchronization problems
and to focus instead on the existence of equilibria. The key
concept here is that it is the information sets [9] that matter
rather than the time of play i.e. since all the nodes at distance
1 from d observe rd before playing, all these nodes belong
to the same information set whether they play at the same
time or at different time instants.
Starting with rd (which is h1 ), it is clear how the game
produces actions at every later stage based on the player
strategies, resulting in a terminal action profile or outcome.
Hence, given rd , an outcome in H K+1 may be associated
with every strategy profile s and so the definition of Nash
equilibrium remains unchanged (see [9] for definitions of
Nash equilibrium, proper subgame, and subgame perfection).
In our game, each stage begins a new subgame which
restricts the full game to a particular history. For example,
a history hk begins a subgame G(hk ) such that the histories in the subgame are restricted to hk+1 = (hk , ak ),
hk+2 = (hk , ak , ak+1 ), and so on. Hereafter, the general
notion of equilibrium we use is the Nash equilibrium and
we shall make it clear when we generalize to subgame
perfect equilibria. We are only interested in pure-strategy
equilibria [9] and in studying the existence question as the
incentive rd varies.

{j|Pj =(j,i)Pi }

The first term (rki − ci ) of (1) is incurred by every participating player and is the one unit of reward from the
upstream parent on the chosen reward path minus the local
cost. Based on the fixed cost assumption, we often drop
this first term when comparing player payoffs from different
strategies since the term is always positive when c = 1. The
second term of (1) (the summation) is the total profit made
by i where (rki − rij )(δj + 1) is i’s profit from the sale to
neighbor j (which depends on δj ). A rational selfish node
will always try to maximize its utility when picking si =
(rki , [rij ]j ). There is an inherent tradeoff between (rki −rij )
and (δj ) when trying to maximize the utility in Equation
(1) in the face of competition as shall become clear later.
A higher offered reward rij allows the player to compete
(and possibly increase δj ) but will cut the profit margin.
Finally, we implicitly assume that the consumer d receives a
constant marginal utility of rd from each player that accepts
to participate - the marginal utility of participation - and
declares rd truthfully to its direct neighbors (i.e. rd is not
strategic).
Before proceeding with the model, we present the following two results (see [8] for the proof):
Theorem 1: In order to maximize her utility, player i
always chooses the highest offer rji where rji ≥ rki , ∀ rki ∈
R(i).
Thus, we shall represent player i’s strategy hereafter simply
with the rewards vector, i.e. si = (ri ), and it should be clear
that player i always chooses the highest offer. When the
rewards are equal however, we assume that a player breaks
ties uniformly (i.e. with equal probability of choosing any of
the equal offers). The uniform tie-breaking assumption differentiates this work from the work in [7]. From Theorem 1
and the strictly decreasing rewards assumption, it may be
shown that an outcome Td of the game is always a tree.
This second result allows us to focus on the existence of
equilibria.

III. E QUILIBRIA ON THE L INE G RAPH , THE T REE , AND
THE R ING G RAPH
In the general game model defined thus far, every outcome (including the equilibrium) depends on the initial
reward/utility rd of the advertiser. In the same spirit as [2]
we inductively construct the equilibrium for the line graph
of Figure 1(a) given the utility function of Equation (1). We
present the result for the line which may be directly extended

A. The Static Multi-Stage Game with fixed schedule
We restrict the analysis of equilibria to the simple line and
ring graphs. In order to apply the correct solution concept,
we fix the schedule of play (i.e. who plays when?) based
on the inherent order of play in the model. We resort to the
21

(a)

observing rd , players 1 and 2 play simultaneously at stage 1
offering rewards r1 and r2 respectively to their downstream
children, and so on. We refer to the players at stage j using
ids 2j − 1 and 2j where the stage of a player i, denoted as
l(i), may be computed from the id as l(i) = d 2i e. Note
that the player at stage K (with id 2K − 1) breaks ties
uniformly with probability 21 , and this is public information.
For the 2-stage game in Figure 1(b)(i), it is easy to show that
an equilibrium always exists in which s∗1 (rd ) = s∗2 (rd ) =
(rd − 1) when rd > 1 and 0 otherwise. This means that
player 3 enjoys the benefits of perfect competition due to
the Bertrand-style competition [9] between players 1 and 2.
We now present the following negative result,
Claim 1: The 3-stage game induced on the ring (of Figure 1(b)(ii)) does not admit a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Particularly, there exists a class of subgames for h1 = rd > 7
for which there is no Nash equilibrium.
Proof: The proof makes use of a counterexample.
Using the backward induction argument, notice first that the
best strategy of players 3 and 4 is to play a Bertrand-style
competition as follows: after observing a1 = (r1 , r2 ), player
3 plays r3 = min(r1 − 1, r2 ) and symmetrically player 4
plays r4 = min(r2 −1, r1 ). Knowing the strategies of players
3 and 4 and the uniform tie breaking strategy of player 5,
players 1 and 2 choose their strategies simultaneously and
no equilibria exist for rd > 7 due to oscillation of the bestresponse dynamics. This may be shown by examining the
strategic form game, in normal/matrix form, between players
1 and 2 (in which the expected utilities are expressed in
terms of rd ). We briefly show the subgame for rd = 8
and we leave the elaborate proof as an exercise for the
interested reader. Figure 2 shows the payoff matrix of players
1 and 2 for playing actions r1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (rows) and
r2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (columns), respectively, eliminating strictly
dominated actions. The player’s utility is taken to be ui =
(rd − ri )δi ignoring the first term of Equation (1). When
r1 = r2 > 1, the expected utility is E{u1 } = E{u2 } =
1
1
2 (rd − r1 )(2) + 2 (rd − r1 )(1). Clearly, no pure strategy

(b)

Fig. 1. (a) Line graph: a player’s index is the stage at which the player
plays; d advertises at stage 0; K = n; (b) Ring graph with even number
of players: (i) 2-stage game, (ii) 3-stage game, and general (iii) K-stage
game.

to trees. Before proceeding with the construction, notice that
for the line, mi = 1 for all players except the leaf player
since each of those players has a single downstream neighbor.
In addition, δi = δj + 1, ∀i, j where j is i’s child (δi = 0
when i is a leaf). We shall refer to both the player and the
stage using the same index since our intention should be
clear from the context. For example, the child of player i is
i + 1 and its parent is i − 1 where player i is the player
at stage i. Additionally, we simply represent the history
hk+1 = (rk ) for k > 0 where rk is the reward offered
by player k (player k’s action). The strategy of player k
is therefore sk (hk ) = sk (rk−1 ) which is a singleton since
mi = 1. For completeness, let r0 = rd . This is a perfect
information game [9] since a single player moves at each
stage and has complete information about the actions of all
players at previous stages. Backward induction may be used
to construct the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We construct
the equilibrium strategy s∗ inductively as follows: first, for
all players i, let s∗i (x) = 0 when x ≤ c (where c is assumed
to be 1). Then assume that s∗i (x) is defined for all x < r and
for all i. Obviously, with this information, every player i may
compute δi (x, s∗−i ) for all x < r. This is simply due to the
fact that δi depends on the downstream players from i who
must play an action or reward strictly less than r. Finally,
for all players i we let s∗i (r) = arg maxx (r − x)δi (x, s∗−i )
where x < r.
Theorem 2: The strategy profile s∗ is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
See [8] for the proof. The proof may be directly extended to
the tree since each player in the tree has a single upstream
parent as well and backward induction follows in the same
way. On the tree, the strategies of the players that play
simultaneously at each stage are also independent.

Fig. 2. The payoff matrix of players 1 and 2 for the 3-stage game on the
ring of Figure 1(b)(ii) when rd = 8.

Nash equilibria exist.
The value rd > 7 signifies the breaking point of equilibrium
or the reward at which a player at stage 1, when maximizing
its expected utility, will always oscillate between competing
for player 5 (by playing large r2 ) or not competing (by playing small r2 ). This negative result for the game induced on
the 3-stage ring may be directly extended to the general game
for the K-stage ring by observing that a class of subgames
G(hK−2 ) of the general K-stage game are identical to the

A. Competition: the ring
We present next a negative result for the ring graph. In
a ring, each player has a degree = 2 and mi = 1 for
all players except the leaf player. We consider rings with
an even number of nodes due to the direct competition
dynamics. Figure 1(b) shows the 2-, the 3-, and general Kstage versions of the game. In the multi-stage game, after
22

show that the players at stage 1 may not unilaterally deviate
from playing fr (k − 1). We prove this claim for player 1
knowing that the same argument applies for player 2. By
definition of fr , player 1 may not play a r1 < fr (k − 1)
since fr (k − 1) is the minimum incentive to get a spanning
tree outcome in subgame G(h2 ). On the other hand, player
1 benefits from playing r1 > fr (k − 1) only if by doing
so she increases δ1 and hence eliminates the competition.
We show that this may not happen by first computing the
minimum reward r1 = φ(k − 1) required for player 1 to
eliminate competition and increase δ1 , and then showing that
player 1 may not benefit by playing r1 given rd∗ = fr (k).
We recursively compute the minimum reward φ(k −j) that a
player at stage j must play to eliminate competition knowing
that the competing player at stage j is playing fr (k − j) as
follow:
2k − 3
(6)
[φ(k) − φ(k − 1)](k − 1) > [φ(k) − fr (k − 1)]
2
where the LHS is the utility from eliminating competition
and increasing δ to (k −1). Equation 6 implies the minimum
reward φ is given by,

3-stage game. While the full game does not always admit
an equilibrium when K > 2 stages, we shall show next
that there always exists an equilibrium for a special class of
subgames.
B. Growth of Incentives and Equilibria
We next answer the following question: Find the minimum
incentive rd∗ , as a function of the depth of the network
K (equivalently the number of stages in the multi-stage
game), such that there exists an equilibrium outcome for
the subgame G(rd∗ ) that is a spanning tree i.e. maximum
participation. We seek to compute the function f such that
rd∗ = f (K).
First, we present a result for the line, before extending
it to the ring. On the line, K is the number of players i.e.
K = n, and fl (K) grows exponentially with depth K as
follows:
Lemma 1: On the line graph, we have fl (0) = 0, fl (1) =
1, fl (2) = 2, and ∀ k > 2,
fl (k) = (k − 1)fl (k − 1) − (k − 2)fl (k − 2)

(2)

The strategy profile s∗ such that a player at stage j plays
s∗j (hj ) = fl (K − j) is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame
G(rd∗ ).
See [8] for the proof of Lemma 1.
Theorem 3: On the ring graph, we have fr (0) = 0,
fr (1) = 1, fr (2) = 2, and ∀ k > 2,
fr (k) = (2k − 3)fr (k − 1) − 2(k − 2)fl (k − 2)

φ(k) = 2(k − 1)φ(k − 1) − (2k − 3)fr (k − 1) + 1

(7)

where φ(1) = 2, φ(2) = 3. From Equations 3, and 7, it may
be shown that in the k-stage game player 1 may not benefit
by playing φ(k − 1) given rd∗ = fr (k) by showing that the
first inequality below holds,
2k − 3
2
2(k − 1)φ(k − 1)
φ(k) + (2k − 3)fr (k − 1) − 1
φ(k)

(3)

[fr (k) − fr (k − 1)]

∗

The strategy profile s such that players at stage j perfectly
compete by playing s∗2j−1 (hj ) = s∗2j (hj ) = fr (K − j) is a
Nash equilibrium for the subgame G(rd∗ ).
Proof: Using induction on k, fr is trivially true for
k = 1, 2. For the base case k = 3, it is straightforward to
see that players at stage 1 may not deviate profitably from
playing fr (2) = 2 given rd∗ = fr (3) = 4 (expected utility
= 3). Assume that fr (x) holds for all x-stage games such
that x < k, construct the k-stage game from the (k−1)-stage
game by adding a stage between d and stage 1 in the (k −1)stage game. In the new k-stage game, by definition of fr ,
no player at stage j, 2 ≤ j ≤ k may deviate profitably from
playing fr (k − j). What remains is to compute fr (k) in the
k-stage game and to show that the players at stage 1 may
not deviate profitably from playing fr (k − 1) given h1 =
fr (k). To compute the minimum incentive rd∗ = fr (k) such
that players at stage k have an incentive to compete (hence
resulting in spanning tree outcome), we solve the following
inequality which directly results in Equation 3,

≥

[fr (k) − φ(k − 1)](k − 1)

≥
≥
>

fr (k) + (2k − 3)fr (k − 1)
fr (k) + (2k − 3)fr (k − 1)
f (k)

The second, third, and last inequalities above follow directly
from the first. The last inequality holds by definition of φ which
concludes the proof.

The result of Theorem 3 may be interpreted as follows:
if the consumer were to play strategically assuming she has
a marginal utility of at least rd∗ and is aiming for maximum
participation, then rd∗ = fr (K) would be her Nash strategy
in the game induced on the K-stage ring, ∀ K > 2 (given
s∗ ).
IV. C ONCLUSION

Broad participation of networked nodes to perform an
activity is often of value to some consumer node. Selfish
networked nodes however do not necessarily have the right
incentives to participate, especially when participation comes
at a cost. We have presented a general network participation
game and studied the existence of equilibria for simple
2k − 3
≥ [fr (k) − fl (k − 2)](k − 2) (4) network structures. While we have presented a general game,
[fr (k) − fr (k − 1)]
2
the results may be directly applied to sensor network settings.
=⇒ fr (k) ≥ (2k − 3)fr (k − 1) − 2(k − 2)fl (k − 2) (5)
A consumer wishes to achieve broad participation from a set
The LHS in (4) is the expected utility of a player at stage of sensor nodes. The consumer incentivizes the nodes by
1 when both players at stage 1 are competing by playing allocating bandwidth to them. The nodes themselves further
fr (k − 1), whereas the RHS is utility from not competing incentivize their neighbors to participate by allocating parts
by playing fl (k − 2). From inequality 5, the minimum such of their bandwidth downstream and so on. We presented
incentive results in equation 3. Next, given rd∗ = fr (k), we equilibrium results for the simplest possible class of graphs:
23

the tree and the ring. We showed that a subgame perfect
equilibrium always exists for the game induced on the tree,
while no such equilibrium exists for the game induced on the
ring graph due to oscillation of best-response dynamics under
competition. While the full game does not have a subgame
perfect equilibrium, we show that there always exists a Nash
equilibrium for a special class of subgames. This required
us to first quantify the growth of rewards, or in other words
the minimum consumer incentive rd such that there exists
an equilibrium outcome which is a spanning tree (i.e. such
that the consumer d achieves maximum participation).
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